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 1. Introduction 
Policies aimed at improving the quality of education are on the agenda of most developed 
economies. Among the educational reforms currently being discussed in these countries, I 
focus here on policies of decentralization. An examination of the OECD countries shows 
considerable variation in the distribution of education responsibilities between the different 
tiers of government and in the degree of autonomy with which these responsibilities are 
carried out (OECD, 2008, 2012a). For instance, in Spain the education decentralization 
process has meant the devolution of most expenditure responsibilities to the regional 
governments, while the central government has retained the decision-making power with 
regard to regulating important elements of the educational system, including curriculum 
design and teachers’ salaries. Elsewhere, in Canada and Switzerland, for example, the 
central government does not have any decision-making power over the educational system. 
Variations in the degree of taxing autonomy of subnational governments are also to be 
found in countries with a similar degree of fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side 
(Blöchliger and Rabesona, 2009).  
Here, drawing on cross-national data, my aim is to examine the effects of decentralization 
on the efficiency of educational policies, with a particular concern for different dimensions 
of decentralization. More specifically, I analyze the effects of decentralization on 
educational outcomes under different decentralization structures, with variables that 
measure the expenditure and revenue sides of decentralization. On the expenditure side, as 
well as including variables that take into account the distribution of education 
responsibilities between levels of government, I also examine the degree of autonomy with 
which these responsibilities are carried out by subnational governments. More specifically, I 
include three variables in the analysis that specifically measure decentralization in the 
education sector. The first is that of education expenditure decentralization, which takes into 
account the division of lower-secondary education responsibilities between different levels 
of government, although it does not inform us about the degree of autonomy with which 
subnational governments spend these resources. The second is that of education conditioned 
expenditure, which measures the degree of subnational autonomy to determine and allocate 
their lower-secondary education expenditure. And the third is that of education decision-
making decentralization, which measures subnational governments’ responsibility for 
regulating or deciding on the main features of the education system. On the revenue side, 
the variable included (tax decentralization), seeks to measure the autonomy of subnational 
governments to raise their own revenues.  
The results show that the autonomy of subnational governments, both on the expenditure 
and revenue sides of their activity, is what really matters in determining the effect of 
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 decentralization on educational outcomes. The decentralization of education expenditure 
responsibilities has a positive effect on educational attainment, corroborating previous 
empirical evidence on this question (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Falch and Fischer, 
2012). However, this effect depends on whether subnational governments can decide with 
autonomy where to allocate their resources. When subnational education expenditures are 
financed with conditional grants from upper levels of government, in which case their 
autonomy to decide on the allocation of funds might be undermined, the effect of 
expenditure decentralization is lowered.  
In addition, I find that the autonomy of subnational governments to take decisions with 
regard to the regulation and management of the education system has a quantitatively more 
relevant effect on educational attainment than expenditure decentralization, an impact that 
depends on subnational governments’ taxing power. Although the effect of decentralizing 
educational decision-making power is positive or non-significant even when there is no 
decentralization of taxing decisions, increasing subnational tax autonomy has a positive 
impact on the efficiency with which educational services are provided by subnational 
governments. Finally, I find that these results hold both if education responsibilities are 
decentralized either to the regional or to the local levels of government. These results are 
robust to the different analyses conducted, thus corroborating that they are not driven by 
the potential endogeneity of decentralization policies.  
I conduct the analysis within the education production function framework, which 
considers the education process as analogous to a firm’s production process (Hanushek, 
1986, 2003), where educational resources or inputs are transformed into educational 
outputs. Within this framework, the inputs to the educational process include student 
characteristics, family and school inputs and community and institutional factors, which 
include the country’s level of decentralization. The output of the educational process is a 
measure of the achievement of individual students. In this study, the OECD PISA 2009 
database provides information both on the achievement level of individual students in 
three subject areas (mathematics, science and reading) and the different inputs of the 
educational process for 294,156 students, grouped in 10,871 schools and belonging to 33 
OECD countries.  
The advantages of using internationally comparable test scores to measure educational 
achievement have been well documented in the empirical literature. It has been 
demonstrated that higher achievement on standardised test scores is related to higher 
labour market returns (Bishop, 1992) and to higher productivity and national growth rates 
(Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007), and that an additional 
part of the return to school performance can be attributed to continuation in school 
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 (Bishop, 1991). Since the interest in students performance in the economic literature comes 
from the well-known theoretical relationship between human capital and growth, students’ 
test scores seem to be a good measure of educational attainment. In addition, PISA test 
scores have the advantage of not only capturing differences in curricular achievement, but 
also of identifying differences in other factors that may be linked with future earnings, even 
if they do not affect students’ test scores at school (OECD, 2012b). Finally, the use of 
internationally comparable test score data allows researchers to analyze the effect of 
different institutional settings on educational attainment, something that is not possible in 
single country cases studies.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the literature 
examining the effects of decentralization. Section 3 describes the methodology I follow in 
the analysis, including the empirical and identification strategies, the measurement of 
decentralization and the data I use in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results when 
regional and local levels of government are jointly analyzed, and section 5 presents the 
results when I differentiate between decentralization at the regional and local level. Finally, 
the last section reports the conclusions and policy implications that can be drawn from the 
analysis. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theoretical background 
According to what has become known as the First Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 
in the absence of externalities and economies of scale, decentralization will improve 
allocative efficiency, since it is assumed that subnational governments have a better knowledge 
than the central government of local preferences and needs, so that the former are better 
placed to match the provision of public goods and services with these preferences (Oates, 
1972). This argument, though, is based on some assumptions that have been called into 
question by more than one author. First, it is assumed that subnational governments have 
the same technical and economic capacity as that enjoyed by the central government to 
manage the delivery of decentralized services (Prud’homme, 1995). Second, it is assumed 
that governments are benevolent, in the sense that they act in the best interests of their 
citizens. However, subnational governments may not have the same capabilities as those of 
the central government and, as underlined by the Second Generation Theory of Fiscal 
Federalism, governments might very well prioritise their own interests (Oates, 2005; 
Weingast, 2009) or fall under the sway of lobbies and rent-seeking groups (Redoano, 2010; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, 2006).  
4
 Seabright (1996) modelled the way in which decentralization can affect a government’s 
incentives to act in the best interests of its citizens. This author argues that government’s 
incentives depend on the degree of political accountability, defined as the probability that the 
welfare of a given region might determine the re-election of the government. Since political 
accountability or the electoral control over incumbents is greater at the subnational level, 
decentralized governments might have more incentives than centralized authorities to act 
in accordance with the preferences of their population and, therefore, to be less corrupt. 
Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) reach similar conclusions 
about the relationship between decentralization, political accountability and government 
behaviour1. Thus, in the context of education, the shortened distance between 
policymakers and parents derived from decentralization is supposed to increase the voice 
of parents, who can thus more effectively demand better education in return for the taxes 
they pay.  
Problems might arise, however, when taxes are collected at the central level of government, 
but education services are provided by subnational governments. If subnational 
governments are highly dependent on intergovernmental fiscal grants to finance their 
expenditures they are not as accountable as they would be if they were financed by their 
own revenues, and their incentives to act in the best interests of their citizens could be 
undermined (Weingast, 2009). It has been demonstrated that this situation of vertical fiscal 
imbalance encourages subnational governments to overspend and generates unsustainable 
deficits and bailout demands, since the costs of local programs are not apparent to the local 
electorate (Bosch and Suárez-Pandiello, 1993; Wildasin, 1997). However, more recent 
studies show that under such a partial fiscal decentralization setting, the efficiency with 
which public goods and services are provided at the subnational level can also be superior 
to that at the central level of government (Brueckner, 2009; Borge et al., 2014).  
Thus, it might be expected that the efficiency with which educational services are provided 
in decentralized countries is also dependent on how subnational governments are financed. 
Greater efficiency is not therefore the automatic outcome of decentralization policies, but 
it will depend on the technical and economic capabilities of subnational governments, and 
their incentives to act in the best interests of their citizens. Thus, empirical analysis is 
necessary in order to determine the circumstances under which a decentralization reform 
might have beneficial or detrimental effects.  
 
                                                          
1 In these studies political accountability is considered in a broader sense, as the electoral rules 
and other institutional mechanisms that constrain the rent-seeking activities of office holders, such 
as taking bribes, favouring of particular interest groups and insufficient innovation and effort.  
5
 2.2. Related empirical studies 
The general approach adopted in analyzing the effects of decentralization in the provision 
of educational services has not sought to identify its impact through any of the specific 
channels discussed above. Rather, previous analyses have tended to examine the 
relationship between a measure of fiscal decentralization and educational attainment, 
measured at the individual level or aggregated at the regional or local levels.  
Examples include Barankay and Lockwood (2007), who measure decentralization as the 
ratio between local and total education expenditure, which is argued to correlate highly 
with local autonomy in the provision of education in Switzerland; Habibi et al. (2001), who 
focus on the revenue side of decentralization in Argentina, measuring it as the ratio of 
controlled resources to total provincial resources; and Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) and 
Galiani et al. (2008), who analyze the effects of the education decentralization process in 
Argentina between 1992 and 1994. The general conclusion reached by these studies is that 
decentralization is positively related to educational outcomes, and that it is more beneficial 
when subnational governments have a low fiscal deficit (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; 
Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2002), and when schools are located in non-poor municipalities 
(Galiani et al., 2008). In the analysis conducted in Chapter 2 for the partial fiscal 
decentralization reform in Spain at the beginning of the eighties I find that while 
decentralization improved educational outcomes of the general programme in regions with 
a high level of public revenues, it had a negative impact on the outcomes of the vocational 
programme in regions with a low level of public revenues.  
While these single country case studies have generated a good deal of useful information 
and plausible hypotheses, there are a number of drawbacks that need to be addressed. First, 
measuring the degree of fiscal decentralization is a complex task that requires identification 
of subnational autonomy and discretion with regard to expenditure and revenue 
arrangements (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). Thus, measuring the degree of fiscal 
decentralization with a single variable, such as the share of subnational expenditure or 
revenues or a dummy that indicates when a decentralization reform has been implemented, 
falls well short of providing a full picture of this decentralization. In this empirical analysis 
I seek to overcome this problem by including a set of decentralization variables that 
measure its different dimensions.  
Second, the conclusions in these studies cannot be generalized to other countries. As 
discussed above, the effects of decentralization in each country will depend on how it is 
designed. Thus, to analyze whether previous evidence for Switzerland, Argentina and Spain 
can be generalized to other countries, evidence of how different structures of revenue and 
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 expenditure decentralization could have a differential impact on educational outcomes is 
needed, and for this, cross-national evidence is necessary. To the best of my knowledge, 
only a few papers have conducted such a cross-national analysis of decentralization in the 
education sector in developed countries (Woessmann, 2001; Falch and Fischer, 2012)2; 
however, these analyses are not concerned with analyzing the way in which different 
decentralization structures have a differential impact on educational outcomes, and thus 
this question has not been addressed in previous empirical literature.  
3. Methodology 
3.1. Empirical strategy 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of decentralization on the efficiency of 
education policy, and to examine the way in which different decentralization structures in 
the education sector can lead to different educational outcomes. In doing so I turn to 
international evidence, which encompasses many education systems typified by a wide 
variety of decentralized structures. I conduct the analysis within the contemporaneous 
education production function framework, which considers the education process as 
analogous to that of the firm (Hanushek 1986, 2003), where educational resources or 
inputs are transformed into educational achievement or outputs. 
Within this framework, the inputs to the educational process include school inputs, namely 
the school resources (such as class sizes and facilities), teacher characteristics (such as 
educational level, experience or sex) and factors related to the organization of instruction 
(such as term length or educational practices); family inputs, which include both home 
resources (such as the financial resources dedicated to education and the time parents 
spend with their children) and family background variables (such as parental education and 
family size); and student characteristics, such as students’ innate ability to learn and their sex. 
Some studies also include community factors, peer group characteristics or institutional factors of the 
education system (such as the decision-making power of the school or government 
decentralization). The output of the educational process is typically a measure of the 
achievement of individual students, in this case student test scores on PISA 2009.  
Since the objective of this study is to estimate the total effects of decentralization on 
educational outcomes, I do not include in the regression equation those inputs that are 
                                                          
2  Some studies have analyzed the impact of the countries’ general level of decentralization on 
educational outcomes. For instance, Díaz-Serrano and Meix-Llop (2012) conduct a cross-national 
analysis of the effects of fiscal and political decentralization on educational outcomes, measured 
with PISA test scores, concluding that fiscal decentralization exerts a positive impact, while the 
effect of political decentralization is ambiguous.  
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 likely to be affected by decentralization, such as school resources, teachers’ characteristics 
or teaching practices3. Thus, I estimate the following expression for a cross-section of 
students in different schools and countries: 
0 1 2 3 4ijk k jk ijk ijk ijkY DC Sc F St            (1) 
where ijkY  is the test score of student i in school j in country k; 0  is the overall mean; 
kDC  is the group of variables that measures the different dimensions of decentralization, 
which would represent the institutional factors considered in our model, measured at the 
country or regional level;
 jk
Sc , measured at the school level, represents the characteristics 
of school j in country k; ijkF  represents the family inputs of student i in school j in country 
k, which are measured at the student level; ijkSt  represents the characteristics of student i 
in school j in country k, which are also measured at the student level; and ijk  is the 
student-specific error term. Individual and school level data were obtained from the 
OECD PISA 2009 database, which is described in Annex I. Table 1 in Annex I defines all 
the variables included in the analysis and the expected sign of their coefficients according 
to theoretical background and previous empirical evidence.  
The advantage of the students’ achievement measures provided by PISA is that they do not 
have a strong curricular focus. Rather, they focus on students’ competencies in the key 
subject areas of mathematics, science and reading. Thus, what PISA seeks to assess is the 
extent to which students near the end of compulsory education have acquired the 
knowledge and skills considered essential to meet real life challenges (OECD, 2012b). Since 
the interest in, and concern for, the educational performance relate directly to the perceived 
importance of schooling in affecting the ability of students to perform in, and cope with, 
society after they leave school (Hanushek, 1986), the PISA test scores seem to be a good 
measure of educational outcomes. 
Estimations are conducted using the weighted least-squares estimation method. Weights 
are equal to the students’ sampling probability, normalised to give an equal weight to each 
country. Since students are grouped in schools, and schools are grouped in countries, we 
need to take into account the dependence between units in the same cluster, even though a 
considerable number of student, school and country level variables are included. Balanced 
repeated replication (BRR) with Fay’s modification is used to compute estimates of the 
sampling variance. In this way, I am able to recognize this clustering of student-level data 
                                                          
3 Otherwise, we would be estimating the direct effects of decentralization without taking into 
account the indirect effects via these educational inputs. 
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 within schools, and of school-level data within countries (Deaton, 1997), but I do not need 
to make any assumption about the distribution or the within-cluster dependence of the 
residuals. In addition, with this method I account for the complex survey data structure of 
the PISA dataset4.  
3.2. Identification strategy  
The main concern in the empirical literature with contemporaneous education production 
functions is that education is seen as a cumulative process, that is, the entire history of 
family and school variables may contribute to a student’s current levels of achievement 
(Hanushek, 1986, 1989). Thus, the history of inputs applied by families and schools and the 
innate ability of students are seen as omitted variables in this specification. As a 
consequence, if inputs into the educational process change over a student’s school life, or if 
they are correlated with the students innate ability (due to the decision-making processes of 
parents or schools), the estimated parameters might be biased (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). 
These problems are more likely to arise in the case of school and family resources, since 
they depend on choices made by parents and schools which, at the same time, are likely to 
depend on a student’s innate ability and to change over the student’s school life. Instead, 
the student characteristics, the family background variables and the institutional factors, 
and, thus, the decentralization variables, are not likely to be affected by such omitted 
variables bias. Thus, this framework seems appropriate in meeting our objectives.  
However, the coefficient of the decentralization variables in such a cross-national 
contemporaneous specification could be biased for a different reason, namely the potential 
endogeneity of decentralization (Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee, 2002). If there were 
observable or non-observable characteristics of countries that were liable to affect both 
decentralization decisions and educational attainment, the omission of these variables 
would make the estimation of the effects of decentralization biased and inconsistent. 
Likewise, to the extent that countries with lower achievement levels are more likely to 
centralize or decentralize than countries with higher achievement levels, decentralization 
coefficients might be biased because of reverse causality.  
This question has rarely been addressed in the education decentralization literature. To the 
best of our knowledge, only Gallego (2010) has examined the endogeneity problem of 
decentralization in education by using the number of native cultures before colonization as 
                                                          
4 Some studies used multilevel regression methods to estimate education production functions 
that do not take into account the sample design information used in PISA to reduce the sampling 
variance. Thus, the sampling variances estimated with these multilevel models will always be greater 
than the sampling variances estimated with Fay replicate samples (OECD, 2009). Annex I presents 
a description of the sampling design of the PISA 2009 database. 
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 an instrument for political decentralization. Falch and Fischer (2012) analyzed the effects of 
education decentralization with aggregated data for a pooled cross-section of 25 countries 
and six waves of educational tests for the period 1980-2000. This enabled them to include 
country fixed effects to control for the time unvarying characteristics of countries that 
might affect both decentralization and educational outcomes, and thus to deal partially with 
the potential endogeneity of decentralization. However, when they include such fixed 
effects they obtain a higher estimated coefficient for the decentralization variable, so that 
their omission makes the decentralization coefficient to be downwards biased. 
In this study, though, by focusing on a cross-section of countries it is possible to use more 
precise measures of decentralization, which are not available for a long time period and 
which would not present sufficient time variation to estimate a fixed effects model for a 
short period. In addition, the inclusion of detailed measures of educational inputs at the 
individual and the school level, including family inputs and background variables, allows 
me to control for differences in the non-observable characteristics of countries that might 
affect educational outcomes via their effect on family inputs (for instance, out-of-school 
lessons or preferences for private schools) and students’ characteristics (such as their 
interest in studying or expected level of education), which is the advantage of using student 
level data. Even though in this way the potential endogeneity of decentralization in such a 
cross-sectional setting is addressed, I conduct additional analyses to corroborate that the 
results are not driven by the potential endogeneity of decentralization.  
First, I include fixed effects that account for the region to which each country belongs. We 
might expect most observable and non-observable characteristics of countries with an 
influence on educational attainment to be common in countries that are close 
geographically5. For instance, the importance attached to education might be similar in 
Asiatic countries, in Nordic countries or in the South of Europe countries. If these 
common characteristics correlated with decentralization policies, and their effect on 
educational attainment was not captured by the variables included in the model, their 
omission from the regression equation might bias the results.  
Second, I run additional regressions controlling for countries’ observable characteristics 
that might be liable to correlate with both educational attainment and decentralization 
policies. These characteristics include the level of economic development (measured with 
per capita GDP) and the perceived corruption in each country (measured using the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which ranges between 10, if the 
                                                          
5 I classify countries in eight regions: South of Europe; Centre of Europe; North of Europe; 
North America and Pacific; East Asia; Latin America and Caribbean; Eastern Europe (and Israel); 
and Ireland and the United Kingdom, the latter being the baseline category.  
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 country is highly clean, and 0, if the country is highly corrupt). If countries were likely to 
decentralize in a systematic way depending on their level of development or corruption, 
and these variables had a significant effect on educational attainment, their omission in the 
regression equation might also cause the estimated effect of decentralization to be biased. 
Although there is not evidence that the level of decentralization depends on the level of 
development, Shah and Shah (2006) show that in lower-income countries subnational 
governments tend to rely more on intergovernmental transfers to finance their 
expenditures than higher-income countries. Finally, in order to corroborate that the results 
are not driven by any particular country in the sample, I repeat the estimations eliminating 
one country at a time.  
3.3. Measuring decentralization 
According to fiscal federalism theory, the positive effects of decentralization derive from 
the better knowledge subnational governments have of their citizens’ preferences and 
needs and the greater accountability of subnational governments, which improves the 
efficiency with which public services are provided6. Thus, the effects of decentralization on 
educational attainment will depend not solely on whether subnational governments are 
responsible for delivering educational services, but also on whether they have the necessary 
autonomy to make decisions about different aspects of the provision of the education 
services and the allocation of educational resources. In addition, the effects of 
decentralization will also depend on how subnational governments are financed, since this 
determines both their economic capacity and their incentives to provide educational 
services with efficiency.  
In order to account for these dimensions, I measure decentralization using a set of 
variables that can be classified according to whether they measure its expenditure or 
revenue sides. On the expenditure side, I include three variables in the analysis that 
specifically measure decentralization in lower-secondary education. The first, and the most 
commonly used in empirical studies, is that of education expenditure decentralization, that is, 
the percentage of direct expenditure dedicated to lower-secondary education by 
subnational levels of government related to the expenditure dedicated to lower-secondary 
education by all levels of government.  
This measure, which takes into account the division of education responsibilities between 
different levels of government, has the disadvantage of not telling us anything about the 
degree of autonomy with which subnational governments spend these resources. It might 
                                                          
6 Efficiency is interpreted here in a broad sense to include inefficiencies such as corruption, waste 
and poor governance (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007). 
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 be the case that most of the expenditure on education in a certain country is made by the 
regional or the local level of government, so that the education expenditure decentralization 
variable would be high, but key features of the educational sector continue to be regulated 
by the central level of government, or decisions about how to spend this money are taken 
centrally. In this situation, subnational governments might see restricted their capacity to 
match educational policies with citizens’ needs and demands. 
Thus, in order to account for these factors, I define two additional variables. First, that of 
education conditioned expenditure, measured as the percentage of subnational direct 
expenditure in lower-secondary education that is financed with specific transfers received 
from upper levels of government. These transfers might be general education transfers, 
that is, resources that have to be devoted to education but which can be freely allocated to 
different uses, or earmarked transfers, over which subnational governments have no 
autonomy as to how they should be spent. Second, the education decision-making 
decentralization variable, measured as the percentage of educational decisions that are taken 
at the subnational level of government. With this variable I measure who has responsibility 
for regulating or deciding on the main features of the education system, such as the 
organization of instruction or personnel management. 
Note that even if subnational governments are responsible for expenditure on education, 
and if they enjoy a high degree of autonomy to decide how to allocate this expenditure or 
to regulate the educational sector, their autonomy can be undermined if they have no 
control over their revenues. For instance, their capacity to increase the level of expenditure 
on a specific education item, without decreasing their expenditure on other areas, can be 
limited under a partial fiscal decentralization regime. In addition, subnational government 
incentives to act in the best interests of their citizens will also depend on how they are 
financed, as discussed above. Thus, the revenue structure of subnational governments has 
major implications for the outcomes of the fiscal decentralization process and needs to be 
included in the analysis.  
In order to take into account whether revenues are generated and controlled autonomously 
by subnational governments, and not whether funds can be spent independently, I define 
the tax decentralization variable. This variable is measured as the ratio of subnational own tax 
revenues (defined as those taxes over which subnational governments have the power to 
define the tax base, the tax rate or both) to general government tax revenues7. The 
definition of the decentralization variables described above is summarized in Table 1. 
                                                          
7 Alternative variables have been proposed in the literature for measuring revenue 
decentralization, the most common being the vertical fiscal imbalance, which measures the extent to 
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 Table 1. Summary of the decentralization variables. 
Expenditure side of decentralization (in lower-secondary education): 
Expenditure Decentralization = (SNG educ. expenditure) / (GG educ. expenditure) 
Conditioned Expenditure = (Conditioned educ. grants) / (SNG educ. expenditure) 
Decision-Making Decentralization = (SNG educ. Decisions) / (number of decisions) 
Revenue side of decentralization: 
Tax Decentralization = (SNG own taxes) / (GG taxes) 
Notes: SNG denotes Subnational Government; GG denotes General Government.  
3.4. Data 
I estimate equation (1) by using a huge dataset, which contains personal and academic 
information for 294,156 students, grouped in 10,871 schools and belonging to 33 OECD 
countries. Individual and school level data were obtained from the OECD PISA 2009 
database, which is described in detail in Annex I. Country level information is also included 
in the dataset to measure education and tax decentralization variables, and the set of 
variables required to conduct the robustness analyses. These data were compiled by author 
based on OECD publications (OECD 2004, 2008, 2012a), the OECD Fiscal 
Decentralization database and OECD.Stat data.  
As we can observe in Table 2 in Annex I, for Belgium and the United Kingdom the 
information of the PISA database is provided at the regional level. Since decentralization 
data for these countries are also provided at the regional level, the number of independent 
observations for decentralization is increased to 35. Each country’s average test scores in 
the subject areas of mathematics, science and reading are included in this table. As we can 
see, average test scores on maths range from 418.51 in Mexico to 546.23 in Korea, with an 
overall mean for OECD countries equal to 495.68. Average test scores on science range 
from 415.91 in Mexico to 554.08 in Finland, with an overall mean for OECD countries 
equal to 500.92. Finally, average test scores on reading range from 425.27 in Mexico to 
539.27 in Korea, with an overall mean for OECD countries equal to 493.38. Thus, there is 
considerable variability in average test scores across countries. Although an important part 
of this can be explained by student, family and school factors, the countries’ institutional 
factors are also relevant in explaining differences between countries (Fuchs and 
Woessmann, 2007).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
which the basic allocation of revenues is such that “governments at each level can command the 
financial resources necessary for them to carry out their expenditure and to be held accountable for 
both spending and taxing decisions” (definition of a fiscally balanced situation according to Hunter, 
1974). The subnational fiscal dependency variable, which measures the share of subnational expenditures 
(or revenues) that is financed with transfers from other levels of government, has also been 
proposed in the literature (De Mello, 2000). With these measures, shared taxes and own taxes are 
treated as equal, although shared taxes are determined by the federal government and are outside 
subnational control. For a detailed discussion of these issues see Sharma (2012). 
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 There is also considerable variability across countries with regard to the degree of 
decentralization and the way in which it is implemented. Table 2 below presents the mean 
and standard deviation of each decentralization variable included in the analysis. As it can 
be observed, average education expenditure decentralization in OECD countries is 66.12 per 
cent, and it presents considerable variation between countries. Average decision-making 
decentralization is significantly lower (35.03 per cent), although it might be partly due to the 
fact that most countries have decentralized educational decisions to the school level rather 
than to subnational levels of government. Figure A.1.a. shows the relationship between 
expenditure decentralization and decision-making centralization. As it can be observed, among 
countries with a similar level of education expenditure decentralization (horizontal axis), there is 
a wide variability with regard to the percentage of educational decisions that are taken at 
the central level of government, especially in the case of countries with a low level of 
expenditure decentralization. This is likely to be explained by the fact that most of these 
countries, with a low level of fiscal decentralization, have granted schools with a high level 
of decision-making autonomy. 
Table 2. Descriptive analysis of the decentralization variables. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expenditure decentralization 66.12 36.91 0 100.00 
Decision-making decentralization 35.03 24.76 0 80.28 
Conditioned expenditure 15.59 21.08 0 64.10 
Tax decentralization 11.29 11.82 0 44.27 
Notes: decentralization data was compiled by author based on OECD publications (OECD 
2004, 2008, 2012a), the OECD Fiscal Decentralization Database and OECD.Stat data. 
 Figure A.1.b also shows considerable variability in the percentage of educational 
expenditure that is financed with conditional transfers among countries with similar levels 
of expenditure decentralization, which ranges between 0 and 64.1%. Finally, tax decentralization 
also presents considerable variation across countries with a high level of education 
expenditure decentralization. However, it should be noted that tax decentralization is below 
50% for all the countries in the sample, with subnational governments being highly 
dependent on transfers from upper levels of government or on shared taxes in most 
countries. Average tax decentralization in OECD countries is 11.29 per cent, a measure that 
contrasts with the average level of education expenditure decentralization, which is 66.12 per 
cent. Despite the variability that countries present with regard to their decentralization 
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 structures, the correlation between these measures of decentralization is quite high, as we 
can observe in Table 38.  
Table 3. Coefficient of correlation between decentralization variables. 
 
Expenditure 
decentralization 
Decision-making 
decentralization 
Conditioned 
expenditure 
Decision-making decentralization 0.728 
  
Conditioned expenditure 0.220 0.103 
 
Tax decentralization 0.487 0.641 -0.294 
        Notes: all the coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 4. Empirical findings 
4.1. The effect of education policy decentralization 
Table 4 presents the results obtained when estimating equation (1) for educational 
attainment in the subject areas of maths, science and reading. For each subject, I estimate 
three alternative specifications. In the first specification, decentralization is measured with 
the education expenditure decentralization variable, which measures the percentage of 
education expenditure in lower-secondary education made at the subnational level of 
government. This variable tells us which level of government is responsible for spending. 
In order to take into account the (lack of) autonomy of subnational governments to spend 
in the area of education, the second specification also includes the education conditioned 
expenditure variable, measured as the percentage of subnational education expenditure that is 
financed with specific educational transfers. Finally, the third specification measures the 
decentralization of education policy with the education decision-making decentralization 
variable, which measures the percentage of educational decisions made at the subnational 
level of government. Thus, this variable accounts both for the responsibility of subnational 
governments to carry out the educational services and their decision-making autonomy.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Since the correlation between education expenditure decentralization and education decision-making 
decentralization is above 70 per cent, they cannot be included in the same specification in order to 
identify their effects. In the specifications in which education decentralization is measured using the 
decision-making decentralization variable I also control for the percentage of decisions that are taken at 
the school level. 
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  Table 4. Education decentralization, autonomy and educational attainment.  
 
Maths 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Expenditure decentralization 0.185*** 0.202*** 
 
 
(0.010) (0.011) 
 
Conditioned expenditure  -0.136*** 
 
  
(0.019) 
 
Decision-making decentralization 
 
0.466*** 
   
(0.019) 
    R2 0.426 0.427 0.432 
    
 
Science 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Expenditure decentralization 0.131*** 0.138*** 
 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
 
Conditioned expenditure -0.055*** 
 
  
(0.019) 
 
Decision-making decentralization 
 
0.421*** 
   
(0.022) 
    R2 0.432 0.432 0.439 
    
 
Reading 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Expenditure decentralization 0.105*** 0.119*** 
 
 
(0.011) (0.012) 
 
Conditioned expenditure -0.111*** 
 
  
(0.017) 
 
Decision-making decentralization 
 
0.292*** 
   
(0.020) 
    R2 0.476 0.477 0.479 
    Students 294,156 294,156 294,156 
Schools 10,871 10,871 10,871 
Regions 35 35 35 
    Notes: the dependent variable is the PISA 2009 international test score for maths, 
science and reading. All the regressions control for the school characteristics, family 
inputs and student characteristics described in Annex I. Missing dummy variables are 
also included in all the specifications. Least-squares regressions weighted by students’ 
sampling probability, normalized to give an equal weight to each country. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level and school level are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The first specification shows that education expenditure decentralization has a positive and 
significant effect on educational attainment for all three subjects. More specifically, a 
country with the 100% of its expenditure having been decentralized to the subnational 
16
 government is expected to score 18.5 points more than a non-decentralized country on the 
maths assessment, 13.1 points more on science and 10.5 points more on reading9. When 
the education conditioned expenditure is also included in the second specification, the 
estimated effect of education expenditure decentralization is even higher. However, as 
expected, the percentage of educational expenditure that is financed with conditional 
transfers from upper levels of government is negatively related to the students’ educational 
achievement.  
Thus, based on these results, if additional subnational expenditure is financed with 
conditioned transfers, subnational autonomy to determine the allocation of funds might be 
low, and thus, the effect of expenditure decentralization might not be so great as if it is financed 
with general transfers or own revenues. As explained above, the positive effects of 
decentralization on educational outcomes are due, to some extent, to the better knowledge 
subnational governments have about local preferences and needs. Thus, if the allocation of 
funds is decided at the central level of government, with less knowledge about local 
circumstances and needs, the efficiency with which these resources are used is not as great 
as if their allocation is decided by the subnational level of government and so the effect of 
decentralizing educational expenditures is also reduced. In addition, it has been widely 
demonstrated that the efficiency with which resources received from upper levels of 
government are used is lower than the efficiency with which own resources are used 
(Rodden, 2002). As a consequence, the higher the percentage of education expenditures 
that is financed with specific grants from upper levels of government, the lower the 
educational outcomes. 
The third specification offers an alternative way to capture the autonomy enjoyed by 
subnational governments in the provision of educational services, by measuring 
decentralization with the education decision-making decentralization variable. This variable does 
not only capture the decision-making autonomy to allocate funds, but also the decision-
making autonomy to regulate the main aspects of the educational process. It can be 
observed that the effect of decentralizing decision-making power more than doubles the 
effect of decentralizing expenditure responsibilities10. Based on these results, a country in 
which all the educational decisions are taken at the subnational level of government can be 
                                                          
9 As a benchmark for size comparisons, the difference in performance between 9th and 10th 
grades, those with the highest percentage of 15-year-old students, is 14 points on the maths 
assessment, 12.5 on science and 17.7 on reading. This difference might be interpreted as what a 
student is expected to learn in a school-year. Alternatively, as PISA test scores were scaled so as to 
have an international standard deviation for OECD countries of 100 points, these effects can also 
be interpreted in terms of percentage points of an international standard deviation. 
10 Table A.1 in the annex of this chapter reports the estimated coefficients for the whole set of 
variables included in this specification. The complete results for the other specifications, which 
include the same set of explanatory variables, are available upon request. 
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 expected to score 46.6 points more than a country in which all the decisions are centralized 
on the maths assessment, 42.1 points more on science and 29.2 points more on reading. 
Thus, the improvement in the educational outcomes as a consequence of decentralization 
appears to be highly dependent on the autonomy of subnational governments to take their 
own decisions. 
4.2. The effect of revenue decentralization on educational policy outcomes 
The previous section has provided an examination of whether the decentralization of 
educational responsibilities and the level of autonomy of subnational governments to carry 
out these expenditures affect educational outcomes. The next step logically, therefore, is to 
examine whether the effects of education decentralization vary according to the degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by subnational governments to raise their own revenues. As discussed 
above, subnational government autonomy to raise their own revenues might influence both 
their economic capacity to carry out their responsibilities and their incentives to act in the 
best interests of their citizens, given that they can be held more accountable if they are 
responsible for raising the revenues required to finance their expenditures. I measure 
subnational government autonomy to raise their own revenues with the tax decentralization 
variable, defined as the percentage of tax revenues over which subnational governments 
have the power to set the tax base or the tax rate.  
Table 5 reports the results obtained in this analysis, when education decentralization is 
measured using the decision-making decentralization variable. As above, I present the estimated 
effects of decentralization on the tests scores for maths, science and reading, and for each 
subject I report two alternative models. In the first model, I test independent effects of 
education decision-making decentralization and tax decentralization. In the second model, I test 
the hypothesis that the effect of education decision-making decentralization depends on the 
level of tax decentralization by including a multiplicative interaction term. The 
decentralization variables have been centred with respect to their means to facilitate the 
interpretation of their coefficients in this specification. The results show that tax 
decentralization is quantitatively significant at explaining educational attainment, especially for 
maths and reading, and that the effect of the decentralization of the education policy 
significantly depends on the tax autonomy of subnational governments.  
Table 5 shows that when tax decentralization is included in the first specification, it lowers 
the predicted effect of education decision-making decentralization. Since both variables of 
decentralization are correlated with each other, when tax decentralization was omitted from 
the regressions above, the decision-making decentralization variable captured its effect. Despite 
the decrease in the coefficients, the effect of decision-making decentralization is still positive 
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 and highly significant. Based on the results in this table, if we compare a country in which 
all educational decisions have been decentralized to the subnational level of government 
with a country in which all the decisions are centralized and with a similar level of tax 
decentralization, we might expect a difference equal to 31 points on the maths assessment, 
40.1 points on science and 16.5 points on reading. As for tax decentralization, if we compare 
two countries with a similar degree of subnational autonomy in education, for each 
percentage point of difference in tax decentralization we might expect a difference equal to 
0.53 points on the maths assessment, 0.06 points on science and 0.43 points on reading.  
Table 5. Decision-making decentralization, tax decentralization and 
educational attainment. 
  Maths Science Reading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Decision-making 
decentralization 
  
0.310*** 0.516*** 0.401*** 0.610*** 0.165*** 0.298*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Tax decentralization 
  
0.533*** -0.354*** 0.067* -0.833*** 0.433*** -0.139*** 
(0.041) (0.050) (0.037) (0.047) (0.035) (0.048) 
Decision-making x 
Tax decentralization 
  
 
0.045*** 
 
0.046*** 
 
0.029*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
                 R2 0.434 0.444 0.439 0.450 0.480 0.485 
Students 294,156 294,156 294,156 294,156 294,156 294,156 
Schools 10,871 10,871 10,871 10,871 10,871 10,871 
Regions 35 35 35 35 35 35 
       Notes: see Table 4. 
When I include the interaction term between the education decision-making decentralization 
and tax decentralization variables, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant. Thus, the effect of education decision-making decentralization on test scores is 
greater the higher the percentage of taxes that are collected at the subnational level of 
government, as can be observed in Figure 1.  
When tax decentralization is set to the mean (11.29 percentage points), the effect of a one 
percentage point increase in decision-making decentralization is 0.516 points for maths, 0.610 
points for science and 0.298 points for reading. For values of tax decentralization below the 
mean this effect decreases, while for values of tax decentralization over the mean this effect 
increases. When tax decentralization is 11 percentage points below the mean, that is, when 
there is no tax decentralization, the effect remains positive for science and non-significant for 
maths and reading. When tax decentralization is 30 percentage points over the mean, as it is 
in Canada and Switzerland, the expected effect of a one percentage increase in education 
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 decision-making decentralization is 1.86 points for maths, 1.99 points for science and 1.15 
points for reading11.  
 Figure 1. Heterogeneous effects of decision-making decentralization. 
  
 
Notes: marginal effects of decision-making decentralization on the PISA 2009 international test 
scores for maths (Figure (a)), science (Figure (b)) and reading (Figure (c)), as a function of 
tax decentralization. Decentralization variables have been centred with respect to their 
means. 95% confidence intervals computed with the Delta method.  
These results corroborate the hypothesis that the efficiency with which education services 
are provided by subnational governments depends on their degree of responsibility in 
raising the revenues required to finance their expenditure, that is, on the accountability with 
which public services are provided. In addition, these results show that the effects of 
decentralizing the education policy are positive or zero when subnational governments are 
not granted powers to raise their own revenues, thus corroborating theoretical 
prescriptions in Brueckner (2009). 
 
                                                          
11 Also the marginal effect of increasing tax decentralization on students test scores in the three 
subjects depend on subnational decision-making autonomy in education. Thus, based on these 
results, the effect of increasing tax decentralization is positive when decision-making decentralization is 
above 7.9 per cent for the maths assessment, above 18.1 per cent for science and above 4.8 per cent 
for reading. 
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 4.3. Robustness tests  
Table 6 reports the results of the additional analyses conducted to check the robustness of 
the conclusions above. Specifications (1) to (3) include different sets of control variables 
considered to measure those factors most likely to be correlated both with decentralization 
and educational attainment, that is, region fixed effects, GDP per capita and the index of 
perceived corruption. As we can observe, these results confirm previous findings about the 
positive effects of education decision-making decentralization and tax decentralization on 
educational outcomes, with the exception of science, for which a negative coefficient is 
found for tax decentralization12.  
We can observe that the education decision-making decentralization coefficients remain the 
same when region fixed effects are added in specification (1) for the three subjects, 
corroborating that the results are not driven by the omission of those characteristics of 
countries that might affect both educational outcomes and decentralization policies and 
which might be common among countries in the same region (although these 
characteristics are relevant to explain educational attainment). When per capita GDP is 
included as a control for the level of development in the different countries in specification 
(2), the effect of education decision-making decentralization increases to 0.40 points on the 
maths assessment, 0.49 points on science and 0.22 points on reading. Similar results are 
obtained when corruption is also included in the regression in specification (3).  
Instead, the effect of tax decentralization on educational attainment falls when I include these 
control variables for the three subjects. As discussed above, tax decentralization is generally 
higher in countries with a higher level of development (Shah and Shah, 2006), so that in the 
specifications in which I do not control for the region fixed effects or the per capita GDP the tax 
decentralization coefficient might be including also the effect of these omitted characteristics. 
Nevertheless, we can observe that it remains positive and significant for the maths and 
reading assessments, although it turns out negative for the science assessment. In addition, 
we observe that the effect of tax decentralization on science educational attainment also 
decreases when I control for the perceived corruption.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Region fixed effects and per capita GDP are statistically significant for the three subjects. The 
perceived corruption index is only statistically significant for science. 
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 Table 6. Robustness analyses. 
 
Maths 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Decision-making decentralization 0.298*** 0.400*** 0.402*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Tax decentralization 0.508*** 0.363*** 0.370*** 
 
(0.058) (0.044) (0.045) 
    R2 0.455 0.436 0.436 
    
 
Science 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Decision-making decentralization 0.417*** 0.490*** 0.471*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Tax decentralization -0.117** -0.100** -0.201*** 
 
(0.052) (0.039) (0.041) 
    R2 0.454 0.442 0.442 
    
 
Reading 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Decision-making decentralization 0.173*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 
 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Tax decentralization 0.196*** 0.339*** 0.363*** 
 
(0.047) (0.039) (0.037) 
    R2 0.488 0.481 0.481 
        Region fixed effects Yes No No 
Per capita GDP  No Yes Yes 
Corruption No No Yes 
        Students 294,156 294,156 294,156 
Schools 10,871 10,871 10,871 
Regions 35 35 35 
        Notes: see Table 4. 
With the exception of the effect of tax decentralization on science test scores, the general 
conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the conclusions presented in the previous 
sections are robust, thus corroborating that they are not driven by the potential 
endogeneity of decentralization. Education decision-making decentralization has a clear positive 
effect on educational attainment in the three subjects, an effect that even increases once I 
control for countries’ characteristics. The effect of tax decentralization decreases when I 
control for such characteristics, although it remains positive and significant for maths and 
science. The results are also robust to the elimination of countries from the sample 
estimation. 
 
22
 5. Comparison of the effects of decentralization to regional and local governments 
The previous sections examined the effects of decentralization on educational attainment 
without differentiating as to whether responsibilities are decentralized to the regional or the 
local levels of government. However, as different levels of government might have 
different technical and economic capabilities, as well as different incentives to act in the 
best interests of their citizens, it might be interesting to examine the separate effects of 
decentralization when the responsibilities are devolved to the regional and the local levels 
of government. Table 7 provides the results of conducting such an analysis. For each 
subject, the first specification measures decentralization with the education decision-making 
decentralization variable and the second specification measures it with the education 
expenditure decentralization variable. Both of them control for the per capita GDP. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from this table is similar to that obtained in the 
previous sections. We can observe a positive and significant effect of education 
decentralization at both levels of government on educational outcomes for the three 
subjects. This is observed both if education decentralization is measured with the decision-
making decentralization variable or the expenditure decentralization variable. As before, the effect 
of education decentralization when it is measured with the decision-making decentralization 
variable more than doubles the effect captured by the expenditure decentralization variable. 
Thus, the improvement in educational outcomes as a consequence of decentralization 
appears to be highly dependent on the autonomy of subnational governments to take their 
own decisions, both at the regional and the local level.  
The effect of decentralizing education responsibilities to subnational levels of government 
differ statistically depending on whether they are decentralized to the regional or the local 
levels of government in some specifications, as indicated by the equality tests presented in 
Table 7. For instance, we can observe that the effect of decision-making decentralization on 
maths test scores is greater when educational decisions are decentralized to the regional 
level and the opposite is true for science and reading test scores. The effect of 
decentralizing expenditure responsibilities is also greater in the science and reading areas 
when they are decentralized to the local governments, while the difference is non 
significant for maths.  
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 Table 7. Regional and local decentralization and educational attainment.   
  Math's Science Reading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Regional decision-making 
decentralization  
  
0.579*** - 0.442*** - 0.268*** - 
(0.022) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.021) 
 
Local decision-making 
decentralization   
  
0.440*** - 0.478*** - 0.378*** - 
(0.023) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.025) 
 
Regional expenditure 
decentralization   
  
- 0.188*** - 0.126*** - 0.026** 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
Local expenditure    
decentralization   
  
- 0.197*** - 0.145*** - 0.168*** 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
        Equality tests 
      
Decision-making decent. 42.29*** 
 
2.86* 
 
35.82*** 
 
Expenditure decent. 
 
0.60 
 
2.74* 
 
211.62*** 
          R2 0.436 0.437 0.442 0.443 0.480 0.482 
Students 294,156 294,156 294,156 294,156 294,156 294,156 
Schools 10,871 10,871 10,871 10,871 10,871 10,871 
Regions 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Notes: see Table 4. The results from testing whether decentralization coefficients are 
equal at the regional and local government are included in the table (Null: 
coefficients are equal).      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,   * p<0.1 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
The effects of decentralization on the efficiency of public services provision remains 
unclear from a theoretical perspective and so empirical analyses are required. However, 
despite this need, empirical studies of this question are scarce. In the context of education, 
studies conducted to date conclude that decentralization is positively related to educational 
attainment, and that it is more beneficial when subnational governments have a low fiscal 
deficit (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2002) and when schools 
are located in non-poor municipalities (Galiani et al., 2008). These studies, however, focus 
their attention on the situation in specific countries, so that their results might not be 
extrapolable to other contexts, and they are unable to provide evidence on how different 
structures of expenditure and revenue decentralization can have a differential effect on 
educational outcomes.  
Thus, the aim of this study has been to use cross-national data to examine the effects of 
decentralization on the efficiency of educational policies, taking into consideration the 
different dimensions of decentralization. More specifically, variables that measure the 
expenditure and revenue sides of decentralization were included in the analysis. On the 
expenditure side, I included variables that take into account the distribution of education 
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 responsibilities between levels of government and the degree of autonomy with which 
these responsibilities are carried out by subnational governments. On the revenue side, the 
variable included in this study seeks to measure the autonomy of subnational governments 
to raise their own revenues. This analysis contrasts with previous ones, since it draws on 
cross-national evidence to analyse how different structures of expenditure and revenue 
decentralization have a differential impact on the efficiency of public education policies. 
The results showed that the decentralization of education expenditure responsibilities has a 
positive effect on educational outcomes in the three subject areas, corroborating previous 
empirical evidence on this topic (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Falch and Fischer, 2012). 
However, the effect of decentralizing decision-making power is significantly more relevant 
than decentralizing expenditure responsibilities. In addition, the effect of education 
decentralization depends on the way in which subnational governments are financed. More 
specifically, the effect of education decentralization is greater the higher the percentage of 
taxes that are collected at the subnational level of government, that is, when subnational 
governments are held accountable for taxing decisions. The estimated effects of education 
decision-making decentralization and tax decentralization are quantitatively relevant. More 
specifically, we observe that depending on the level of tax decentralization, the effect of an 
additional percentage point of education decision-making decentralization ranges from 0 to 
1.86 points on the maths assessment, from 0.1 to 1.99 points on science and from 0 to 1.15 
points on reading. When I differentiated between the effects of decentralization depending 
on the level of government that is granted responsibility for education, we observed 
positive effects of decision-making and expenditure decentralization both at the regional 
and the local levels of government. 
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 Annex 
Figure A.1. Decentralization in OECD countries.  
Figure A.1.a. Education expenditure decentralization and decision-making centralization. 
 
 
Figure A.1.b. Education expenditure decentralization and conditioned expenditure. 
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 Figure A.1.c. Education expenditure decentralization and tax decentralization 
 
Notes: in Figure A.1.a. education decision-making centralization is represented, 
because some countries have decentralized the decision-making power to the 
schools instead of to the subnational governments, and thus the education decision-
making decentralization variable would not provide a complete picture of the 
decentralization scheme. In Figure A.1.b. countries in which the education conditioned 
expenditure was equal to zero are not represented.  
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 Table A.1. Complete results of the model (3) in Table 4. 
  Maths Science Reading 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Decentralization             
Decision-making decentralization 0.466*** 0.019 0.421*** 0.022 0.292*** 0.020 
School characteristics       
Public school -8.312*** 2.407 -9.698*** 2.457 -8.523*** 2.434 
Private govern. depend. school -8.094*** 2.977 -9.852*** 3.005 -4.316 2.851 
Location - Small town 5.027*** 1.608 3.745** 1.780 2.085 1.463 
Location - Town 4.325*** 1.318 2.344 1.483 3.671*** 1.277 
Location - City 3.685** 1.468 2.060 1.469 7.230*** 1.402 
Location - Large city -0.663 1.667 -2.022 1.851 5.028*** 1.584 
Availability of other schools 1.178 1.068 2.403** 0.961 3.379*** 0.884 
Schools decision-making power 0.573*** 0.027 0.647*** 0.025 0.375*** 0.024 
Family inputs       
Family resources       
Mother full-time 2.743*** 0.638 2.686*** 0.622 2.466*** 0.424 
Mother part-time 8.458*** 0.680 7.700*** 0.707 5.267*** 0.602 
Father full-time 4.065*** 0.698 1.789** 0.763 0.812 0.685 
Father part-time -11.622*** 0.895 -12.939*** 0.931 -11.798*** 0.894 
Out-of-school lessons 0h 18.018*** 0.696 10.274*** 0.759 14.397*** 0.787 
Out-of-school lessons 2-4h -1.782** 0.898 -9.544*** 1.139 -5.151*** 1.041 
Out-of-school lessons 4-6h -2.636** 1.221 -20.103*** 1.417 -18.755*** 1.478 
Out-of-school lessons more 6h -2.346 2.152 -28.512*** 2.730 -31.182*** 1.973 
Home educational resources 7.796*** 0.337 6.003*** 0.285 4.935*** 0.259 
Wealth index 0.524* 0.316 -0.149 0.317 -0.635** 0.300 
Family background       
Parents’ education 1.980*** 0.100 2.023*** 0.096 1.631*** 0.087 
Parents’ job white collar high skil. 22.589*** 0.903 21.637*** 0.840 24.147*** 0.800 
Parents’ job white collar low skil. 9.803*** 0.896 9.225*** 0.877 10.220*** 0.792 
Parents’ job blue collar high skil. 5.508*** 0.872 5.054*** 0.806 3.981*** 0.896 
Books 11-25 7.204*** 0.729 9.684*** 0.697 7.826*** 0.759 
Books 26-100 20.605*** 0.731 23.271*** 0.731 20.099*** 0.705 
Books 101-200 32.619*** 0.812 33.766*** 0.871 30.138*** 0.800 
Books 201-500 45.444*** 0.912 45.931*** 0.992 39.523*** 0.962 
Books more 500 43.912*** 1.019 44.014*** 1.181 35.403*** 1.092 
Living with both parents 42.590*** 1.619 42.198*** 1.654 39.609*** 1.567 
Living with single mother 38.137*** 1.686 40.207*** 1.677 38.092*** 1.595 
Living with single father 36.307*** 2.161 37.041*** 2.110 33.192*** 2.016 
Living with siblings  1.455*** 0.522 -2.048*** 0.597 -1.877*** 0.580 
Living with grandparents -5.396*** 0.734 -2.691*** 0.763 -6.746*** 0.683 
Native students 2.673*** 0.914 8.699*** 0.949 3.338*** 0.887 
Speak test language -1.656* 0.886 7.108*** 0.996 9.293*** 0.890 
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 Table A.1. Complete results of the model (3) in Table 4 (continued). 
  Maths Science Reading 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Student characteristics       
Female -27.136*** 0.538 -20.575*** 0.474 17.116*** 0.412 
Grade 7 -80.969*** 4.752 -80.956*** 5.835 -88.505*** 4.403 
Grade 8 -48.509*** 1.927 -49.237*** 1.823 -58.224*** 1.606 
Grade 9 -14.881*** 1.257 -19.579*** 1.409 -22.210*** 1.241 
Grade 10 0.894 1.247 -7.026*** 1.321 -4.449*** 1.178 
Age (months) 0.422*** 0.056 0.543*** 0.069 0.261*** 0.063 
General programme 19.389*** 0.946 15.882*** 1.053 21.069*** 0.965 
Pre-primary educ. no -12.751*** 0.948 -10.107*** 0.853 -11.433*** 0.777 
Pre-primary educ. less 1 year -8.028*** 0.725 -2.230*** 0.599 -2.170*** 0.552 
Expected university 35.993*** 0.818 31.518*** 0.810 33.727*** 0.576 
Enjoyment of reading 17.007*** 0.266 24.756*** 0.305 26.263*** 0.236 
Library use -10.544*** 0.242 -10.908*** 0.208 -9.867*** 0.200 
Constant 411.665
*** 4.540 419.247*** 4.239 385.690*** 3.986 
R2 0.432 0.439 0.479 
Students 294,135 294,135 294,135 
Schools 10,871 10,871 10,871 
Regions 35 35 35 
Notes: the dependent variable is the PISA 2009 international test score for maths, 
science and reading. All the regressions include missing dummy variables. Least-
squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability, normalised to give 
an equal weight to each country. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
the country level and school level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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